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Abstract: China set up pilot Emission Trading Schemes (ETS) in seven cities and 
provinces from 2013 as a new instrument to incentivise carbon dioxide emission 
reduction and to reach its 40-45% carbon intensity reduction target by 2020. Using a 
two-stage survey (a closed-form questionnaire followed by open interviews), we elicit 
views of stakeholders from Guangdong province on carbon markets, with an emphasis 
on how ETS would interact with other existing or proposed low-carbon and clean 
energy policies. Our survey shows that academic stakeholders viewed the interactions 
between the carbon market and other low-carbon policies as a significant potential 
problem but there was less awareness by stakeholders from other sectors.  There is a 
positive correlation between recognising such policy interactions may pose a problem 
and the time spent working on energy saving and emission reduction policies. Whereas 
both increasing renewable targets and imposing a carbon tax in addition to an existing 
ETS would be expected to depress prices in the ETS, relatively few respondents 
identified this effect correctly. Apart from government respondents, all other 
stakeholders lacked confidence in China’s carbon markets, which is associated with 
both their lack of knowledge and information about the market and concerns regarding 
uncertainties and government policy design. The need for learning from the pilot 
schemes particularly on monitoring, reporting and verification was seen as vital but 
challenging given the speed of rolling out a national ETS.   
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1. Introduction 
China’s economy has been growing at a sustained average annual rate of over 9% for 
three decades and energy use has therefore increased five times since 1980 (to nearly 3 
billion tons of oil equivalent in 2011) (IEA, 2016). In 2010, China’s energy 
consumption exceeded the United States (Lee and Zhang, 2012). As coal continues to 
dominate the primary energy structure and occupy a majority of incremental electricity 
demand in China, energy consumption growth driven by rapid economic China to 
become the world’s leading emitter of greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) (Guan et al., 
2008). The Paris Accord agreed in December 2015 sets out a global action plan to put 
the world on track to avoid dangerous climate change, by limiting global warming to 
well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels in the long-term, and to pursue best efforts 
to limit increased warming to 1.5°C (UNFCCC, 2015). China also formally submitted 
its intended nationally determined contribution (INDC) to the new global climate 
agreement as lowering carbon dioxide intensity by 60-65% from 2005 levels and 
peaking its greenhouse gas emission by around 2030 (NDRC, 2015). 
Since the emergence of the EU emissions trading scheme (ETS), which has been the 
main means for Europe to drive emission reductions cost-effectively using market 
forces, the world has witnessed a rapid growth in national and sub-national emission 
trading schemes (World Bank, 2014). The New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme 
(NZ ETS) started in 2008 and is the first ETS covering the forestry and waste sectors.  
The Swiss ETS was also introduced in 2008 and now covers 55 companies from 25 
categories of activities, and in 2017 agreed to link to the EU ETS. In the U.S., the 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) began operation in 2009 and covers carbon 
dioxide emissions from power plants in nine Northeast and Mid-Atlantic states. In 
Canada, in 2007, the province of Alberta set up a GHGs reduction program under its 
Specified Gas Emitters Regulation (SGER). The largest cap-and-trade system outside 
of Europe is that of California, which in 2014 linked up to the smaller cap-and-trade 
system in the province of Quebec and in 2018 expanded to the province of Ontario. In 
addition, Japan has established various sub-national systems since 2010 including ETSs 
in Tokyo, Kyoto and Saitama.  
Although China has not adopted mandatory national emission abatement targets, initial 
steps towards a national carbon market have been taken through piloting regional 
carbon emission trading systems, with an eye to establishing a carbon pricing system 
in the country. In March 2011, China officially included pilot ETSs into the Twelfth 
Five-Year Plan with a view to helping meet its 2020 carbon intensity target (Cui et al., 
2014). In October 2011, seven pilot cities and provinces (Figure 1) were authorized to 
proceed by the central policy-making body, the National Development Reform 
Commission (NDRC) (NDRC, 2011). Since the final pilot ETS commenced trading in 
Chongqing on 19 June 2014, all seven pilots in China have been in operation. Carbon 
dioxide emissions are being monitored in China’s pilot schemes so far (although the 
Chongqing pilot ETS also covers non-CO2 GHGs including CH4 and N2O), and the 
trading period of the seven pilot ETS ran from 2013 through 2016, after which a 
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national ETS was launched on 19 December 2017 (NDRC, 2016; NDRC, 2017). 
Initially, the seven Chinese pilot ETS were scheduled to end after three compliance 
years and be replaced by the national ETS in 2016. However, as the launch of national 
ETS was postponed to the end of 2017, the pilots were continue operating until then 
and probably also beyond. The initial phase of the national ETS will give regulators the 
opportunity to improve system design as well as allow market participants time to 
familiarize themselves with the ETS based on experiences in the pilots.  
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Figure 1 Map of seven pilot ETSs in China (Ernst & Young, 2014) 
Each province or city participating in a pilot ETS has a different economic growth 
outlook and GHG emissions profile, which implies each pilot ETS will have different 
effective reduction targets and design characteristics in order to achieve its target. For 
instance, Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Shenzhen are commercial centres along the coast, 
with relatively higher GDP per capita, and larger commercial and residential buildings 
are covered in these ETS (Table 1). Conversely, Hubei and Chongqing are located in 
central China with a lower GDP per capita but higher GDP growth rates and are less 
commercialised. Accordingly, these pilot ETS cover heavy industrial sectors only, and 
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emissions offset credits must originate from within their own provinces, because the 
abatement cost is expected to be cheaper within these provinces (Ernst & Young, 2014). 
The diversity of the emissions trading market design roughly corresponds to the 
regional income level, thus regional emission reduction targets can be achieved without 
adversely affecting economic growth projections.  
Guangdong Province, often referred to as the Pearl River Delta Economic Zone, has 
some characteristics of an advanced industrialized economy. Guangdong Province 
contributes 11.6% of national GDP in 2013, and the Guangdong ETS pilot is the largest 
of the seven schemes, with an absolute cap of 408 MtCO2 in 2014, initially covering 
the power and industry sectors, to be followed by the transportation sector. These 
sectors account for more than half of the province’s emissions (ICAP, 2016). Hence, 
the experiences of implementing carbon emission trading policies in Guangdong will 
be important in designing and operating a larger national ETS. To avoid any confusion 
with the other six pilot systems, survey respondents were asked to provide all their 
answers with reference to the Guangdong pilot. The detailed survey design is described 
in section 2. 
1.1. Interactions across low-carbon incentive policies 
Since the launch of the EU ETS in 2005, emissions trading has become a popular 
instrument to encourage climate mitigation globally (Brouwers et al., 2016; Yang et al., 
2016; Wang et al., 2015; ECCC, 2015; Cui et al., 2014). However, the collapse of EU 
allowances (EUAs) prices in 2008 following the global financial crisis significantly 
weakened incentives to continue reducing emissions. Although the financial crisis of 
2008-2009 and overly generous national allowance allocations (IETA, 2014; Zhang and 
Wei, 2010; Schleich, et al., 2009) were generally recognized as the principal causes for 
the drop, further studies have shown that the interactions between the emissions trading 
market and competing energy and low-carbon policies also contributed to weakening 
impact on the ETS. 
Hone (2013) argues the EU ETS, in combination with other low-carbon policies 
(notably binding European commitments on renewables) has ‘distorted emissions 
mitigation economics across the EU, and the recession has further exacerbated the 
situation’. Figure 2 demonstrates the shift of the abatement curve driven by parallel 
low-carbon policies: the marginal abatement cost curve (MACC) is a set of points 
reflecting the options with marginal costs and emission reductions (Ellerman and 
Decaux, 1998). With the increasing emission reductions, the option with the lower 
marginal abatement cost sets the price for emission permits. Total emission reductions 
will be achieved at least cost until the equilibrium market price has been reached (Ekins, 
et al., 2012) (Figure 2(a)). In principle, if a country adopts a stringent mandatory policy 
to promote low-carbon technologies through parallel energy and low carbon policies 
(such as an ambitious renewable obligation target, a mandatory energy efficiency 
program, or a high carbon tax), the MACC would shift to the right (as illustrated in 
Figure 2(b)) and thereby the carbon price visible in the market will fall. 
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Table 1 Overview of ETS pilots in China  
 Shenzhen Shanghai Beijing Guangdong Tianjin Hubei Chongqing 
General Information 
Starting Date 18 Jun. 2013 26 Nov. 2013 28 Nov. 2013 19 Dec. 2013 26 Dec. 2013 2 Apr. 2014 19 Jun. 2014 
Reduction Target5 21% 20.5% 20.5% 20.5% 20.5% 19.5% 19.5% 
GHG emissions6 
(MtCO2e) 
153 297.7 188.1 610.5 215 463.1 243.1 
Per Capita GDP 
(2013) 
CNY 136,947 
(EUR 18,727) 
CNY 90,092 
(EUR 12,320) 
CNY 93, 213  
(EUR 12,746) 
CNY 58,540 
(EUR 8,005 ) 
CNY 99,607 
(EUR 13,621) 
CNY 42,613 
(EUR 5,827) 
CNY 42,795 
(EUR 5,852) 
Per Capita GDP 
Growth (2013) 
11.5% 6.1% 5.2% 7.8% 7.9% 9.7% 11.3% 
ETS Size 
Absolute Cap 
(MtCO2) 
34.78 
(2015) 
155 
(2016) 
46 
(2016) 
422 
(2016) 
160-170 
(2016) 
253 
(2016) 
100.4 
(2016) 
Estimated Coverage 40% 57% 45% 60% 60% 35% 40% 
Scope Industry; Power;  
Buildings 
Industry; 
Transport; 
Aviation;  
Buildings 
Industry;  Power; 
Buildings 
Industry; Power Industry;  Power;  
Buildings 
Industry;  Power Industry; 
Power 
Firm or facility-level 
threshold for inclusion 
in ETS  
Enterprise: 5,000 
tCO2e/year;  
public buildings: 
20,000 m2;  
government 
buildings:  10,000 
m2 
Power and 
industry: 20,000 
tCO2/year; non-
industry: 10,000 
tCO2/year 
5,000  tCO2/year, 
considering both 
direct and indirect 
emissions 
20,000  tCO2/year  
or 10,000 tce/year 
energy 
consumption  
20,000  tCO2/year 
considering both 
direct and indirect 
emissions 
10,000 tce/year 
energy 
consumption 
20,000  
tCO2e/year 
                                                          
5 Carbon intensity reduction target by 2020 (end of the 13th Five-Year Plan), based on carbon intensity level in 2015.  
6 Overall GHG emissions excluding LULUCF in 2012. 
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Allocation and Purchase 
Allocation 
methodology 
Bench-marking Bench-marking 
and Grand-
fathering7 
Bench-marking 
and Grand-
fathering8 
Bench-marking 
and Grand-
fathering9 
Bench-marking 
and Grand-
fathering 
Grand-fathering Grand-fathering 
Purchase allowance Auction (3% of 
allowances in 
2014) 
One-off action 
before 
compliance 
deadline 
Buy or auction 
allowances in 
order to stabilize 
the market. 
Auction (3% in 
2013 and 10% in 
2015, 2016) 
Buy or sell 
allowances in 
order to stabilize 
the market 
Auction  
(small proportion) 
Free allocation; 
reduction factors 
will be applied if 
allocation 
exceeds the cap;  
Flexibility 
Banking Allowed 
Borrowing Not allowed 
Offsetting10 Domestic offsets 
Offset Limitation11 10% 5% 5% 10% 10% 10% 8% 
Compliance 
Compliance period one year 
MRV Annual reporting of CO2; third-party verification is required 
Penalties for non-
compliance  
CNY 50,000-
150,000  
(EUR 6,544-
19,632)  
CNY 10,000-
50,000  
(EUR 1,308-
6,544)  
up to 50,000  
(EUR 6,544)  
CNY 10,000-
50,000  
(EUR 1,308-
6,544)  
No financial 
penalties  
CNY 10,000-
150,000  
(EUR 1,309-
19,632)  
No financial 
penalties  
Penalties for failing to 
surrender enough 
allowances 
3 times the 
average market 
price  
N/A 3-5 times of 
average market 
price 
2 times of 
allowances 
deducted from 
allocation for the 
following year 
Disqualified for 
preferential 
financial support 
and policies for 3 
years  
1-3 times of the 
average market 
price 
Disqualified for 
preferential 
financial support 
and policies for 3 
years  
Sources: NDRC, 2013; ICAP, 2018; China Statistical Yearbook, 2014
                                                          
7 Mainly free allocation through grandfathering based on 2009-2012 emissions or emissions intensity; Bench-marking is for specific entities.  
8 Mainly free allocation through grandfathering based on 2009-2012 emissions or emissions intensity; Bench-marking for new entrants and entities with expanded capacity. 
9 Mainly free allocation through grandfathering based on 2009-2012 emissions or emissions intensity; Bench-marking for electricity generators, certain cement and iron and steel industrial 
processes and new entrants. 
10 Domestic project-based carbon offset credits - China Certified Emission Reductions (CCER) are allowed. 
11 The use of CCER credits is limited to corresponding proportion of the annual compliance obligation. 
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In theory, energy and low-carbon policies could act in a complementary manner: for 
instance, renewable energy obligations could contribute to carbon emission reduction 
targets while carbon abatement instruments should stimulate renewable energy 
deployment (Fischer and Preonas, 2010). However, a number of studies highlight that 
in practice there has been duplication and conflict between different policies that are all 
nominally meant to work together to incentivize emission reductions: Sorrell (2003) 
points out that the UK renewable obligation would interact with the EU ETS such that 
emissions reductions would be double counted and no extra reduction would be 
achieved. Furthermore, other studies show how a renewable obligation can depress 
emission prices in an ETS (Pethig and Wittlich, 2009; Bohringer and Resendahl, 2010; 
Sijm, 2011; Richstein et al., 2015), and do not contribute to long-term emissions 
reductions (Syri and Cross, 2013).  Although a number of studies on interactions have 
focused on Europe, there are few studies of potential interactions between different 
climate change and renewables policies in China. 
Cost of carbon emission 
reduction
MACC
MACC
Carbon emission reduction 
amount
Real carbon price
Visible carbon price
Reduction target
Real reduction demand
Hidden carbon price
Carbon emission reduction 
amount
Cost of carbon emission reduction
Mandatory 
policies, 
such as 
Renewable 
Obligations, 
etc.
(a)
(b)
Figure 2 Impact of parallel low-carbon policies on marginal abatement cost curve 
(MACC) (adopted from Hone, 2013) 
1.2. Motivation and contribution 
China is still at an early stage in establishing a functional and effective emission trading 
system to facilitate GHG emissions reductions, so existing studies mainly describe the 
market features and characteristics (Cheng and Zhang, 2011; Zhou and Duan, 2011; 
Zhang, et al., 2014; Duan et al., 2014), market design and relevant legal and regulatory 
issues (Fan and Wang, 2014; Wu et al., 2014; Jiang et al., 2016; Qi et al, 2014a), or 
model the economic performance and impact of emission trading in China at some point 
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in the future (Zhou, et al., 2013; Qi, et al., 2014b). The history of potentially competing 
policies, such as renewable energy support, is longer in China, but has taken many 
forms over the past decade and has not settled into as clear a policy signal as, for 
example, the Renewable Energy Directive in the European Union (Ragwitz and 
Steinhilber, 2014). 
The design and implementation of carbon market are influenced by different 
stakeholders: government and industry who are directly involved in the markets, 
academics and non-government organizations (NGOs) who have relevant expertise or 
experience and will also contribute to market design and functioning.  Consequently, it 
is critically important to investigate stakeholder views on the Chinese carbon market 
because policy construction would benefit from greater participant confidence, which 
would contribute to wider public acceptance.  
Although previous studies suggest parallel low-carbon policies could influence 
allowance prices in the ETS and send industry the wrong signals, there has been little 
work on the potential interactions between low-carbon policies and the pilot ETSs in 
China and on related stakeholder views.  Identifying policy interactions is vital for the 
emerging carbon market in China, as a common understanding between stakeholders 
would help improve national climate change (and energy) policy planning and avoid 
some of the problems experienced in other countries and systems.  
This is the first survey with a focus on the interaction of low-carbon and energy policies 
interaction in China, which we hope can open the discussion and provide policy-makers 
with a better understanding of some of the built-in biases and perceptions of key actors. 
The structure of our study is as follows: section 2 describes the survey methodology 
Section 3 presents the survey results and the last section provides discussion, 
conclusions and policy recommendations. 
2. Methodology and Demographic Information 
A number of studies on both stakeholder and public perspectives towards climate 
change issues have been conducted in a range of topics including stakeholder 
perceptions on Carbon Capture and Storage (Liang and Reiner, 2013; Reiner and Liang, 
2011; Li, et al., 2012, etc.), mandatory reporting of GHG emissions  (Lai, 2014) or 
climate adaptation (O’keeffe, et al., 2016). On the question of policy interactions, 
Fischer and Preonas (2010) provide a theoretical rationale for why overlapping low-
carbon policies will have a depressing effect on emission markets, which have been 
confirmed in empirical studies (Koch, et al., 2014) and economic models (Morris, et al., 
2010). However, there has been no studies at the intersection of stakeholder studies and 
policy interaction, to determine, for example, whether analysts have effectively 
conveyed the potential impact of these  interactions and whether this has been 
appreciated by stakeholders. Therefore, we adopt a survey approach to help examine 
stakeholder awareness of policy interactions. 
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We employed a two-stage survey consisting of a questionnaire and follow-up 
interviews. 100 internet-based questionnaires were sent out to stakeholders involved in 
the Guangdong pilot ETS in June 2014, followed by semi-structured telephone 
interviews with a subset of 10 respondents for a deeper understanding of stakeholder 
views in August 2014. 
2.1 Internet-based questionnaire design 
The online survey system Wenjuan was adopted as the survey platform. The internet-
based questionnaire was made up of 22 questions, involving a combination of multiple-
choice, ranking and open-ended questions to obtain stakeholder views on a range of 
issues including Chinese emission reduction policies and carbon markets, 
understandings of the interactions between policies as well as views on potential 
challenges in the implementation of the Chinese carbon markets. All stakeholders were 
asked to respond based on their personal opinions, knowledge and experience.  
The pool of respondents drew upon those with significant involvement in the 
Guangdong pilot ETS with respect to market design and policy making, market 
participation and relevant research. Specifically, we adopted an expert sampling 
approach, selecting equal numbers of senior stakeholders from each of the key groups, 
i.e., 25 government stakeholders of at least at director level within the relevant ministry; 
25 industry stakeholders of at least deputy general manager level in listed companies in 
the energy sector; 25 academic stakeholders that are lecturers or above working in 
energy and environment; and another 25 stakeholders that work at managerial level in 
environmental NGOs. An invitation letter and a participant information letter were sent 
to each stakeholder by email at the same time describing the purpose of the study, and 
the principle of anonymity and confidentiality that would be employed.  
The questionnaire began with a set of general questions about their role and experience 
of participants before turning to their evaluation of low-carbon policies and incentives. 
The next set of questions focused on their perspectives regarding Chinese carbon 
emission reductions including emissions trading and other emission reduction 
instruments. Specifically, respondents were asked to estimate and rate the likelihood of 
China achieving deep cuts in GHGs over the next 10 years, and to select the most cost-
effective policy instruments to reduce GHGs in China. We also asked how respondents 
explained the collapse of the carbon price in the EU ETS as well as their assessment 
and expectations of the pilot carbon markets in China. 
Subsequently, what-if scenario questions were designed to explore stakeholder 
opinions on the interactions between other low-carbon policies and the Guangdong 
pilot ETS. They were asked to consider the most likely immediate impact on the carbon 
price in the Guangdong pilot ETS if either a new short-term renewable energy 
obligation or a carbon tax were to be enacted. Furthermore, stakeholders were asked 
for their views on potential conflicts between energy saving and emission reduction 
measures on the one hand, and between a national ETS and international systems on 
10 
 
the other. The last few questions covered issues associated with building markets, 
including potential challenges for market regulation and implementation barriers.  
2.2 Semi-structured telecom interview design 
As a follow up to the questionnaire, we conducted semi-structured interviews to obtain 
more detailed views. The main selection criterion was that the respondents indicated 
that they spent more than 50% of their working time on energy saving and emission 
reduction policies in China in the past year to be able to realistically have a more in-
depth discussion about the issues involved.  Interviewees were asked to provide: 
• A brief overview and outlook for Chinese pilot carbon markets; 
• More detailed reasons to explain the options they chose in the what-if scenario 
questions;  
• Opinions on the main challenges for implementation of Chinese carbon market. 
2.3 Demographic information of respondents 
We received 30 responses out of a total of 91 internet-based questionnaires delivered 
(for a response rate of 33%). The sectoral distribution of respondents was: industry 
(26.7%), finance (20%), consulting (16.7%), government (10%), academia (13.3%) and 
NGOs (10%) (Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3 Sectoral breakdown of respondents 
In the past year, one third (33.3%) of respondents spent more than 50% of their working 
time on energy and climate policy although none of them spent 90% or more of their 
working time on the subject. A further 30% spent from 20-50% of their working time 
and over one third (36.7%) of them spent less than 20% of their time on relevant policy 
issues. The Internet, conferences and newspapers were the main channels that a large 
majority of respondents used to obtain up-to-date information about the Chinese carbon 
market, followed by TV news and personal networks.  
26.67%
13.33%
10.00%
16.67%
20.00%
10.00%
3.33% Industry
Academia
Government
Consulting
Finance
NGO
None of above, please specify:
Emission Trading Exchange
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3. Results and Findings 
3.1. Perspectives on emissions reduction and carbon market in China 
3.1.1 Predictions about emissions reductions in China 
As the world’s largest emitter, China has started to develop low-carbon economy since 
1990s: the first White Paper regarding sustainable development was published in 1994, 
followed by the ‘Program of Action for Sustainable Development in China in the early 
21st Century’ in 2003.  China enacted its first ‘Renewable Energy Law’ in 2005, soon 
to be followed by ‘Energy-saving and Emission Reduction’ national programme from 
2006 (Wu et.al, 2012).  It was not until the energy plan proposed in the Eleventh and 
Twelfth Five-Year Plans in 2006 and 2011 that specific quantitative emission reduction 
targets were set: reduce 40-45% GHG intensity by 2020 base on 2005 level (Hu and 
Monroy, 2012; Yuan and Zuo, 2011). In the Thirteenth Five-Year Plan (2015-2020), 
China has set a stronger and more ambitious reduction target of 48% reduction in GHG 
intensity from 2005 levels by 2020, in line with China’s pledge at the CoP21 conference 
in Paris in December 2015, where the Chinese government promised to peak carbon 
emissions by 2030 as well as to lower GHG intensity by 60-65% below 2005 levels 
(NDRC, 2015).  
Asked about expectations on whether current climate policies in China could achieve 
deep cuts in GHG intensity in the next 10 years, most respondents were pessimistic: 
half (50%) considered it difficult to reach a stringent target, and another 20% of 
stakeholders were not sure, although over one quarter (26.7%) of stakeholders believed 
such reductions were likely, and one stakeholder (3.3%) believed it was ‘very likely’ 
(Figure 4). The results are consistent with a previous survey conducted in 2009, where 
more than 80% of respondents believed it would be ‘difficult’ or ‘very difficult’ to 
achieve  deep cuts in GHG in the next 20 years (Liang et al., 2011).  
 
Figure 4 Expectation of deep cuts in GHG intensity in China by sector of respondent 
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Recent studies on emissions reductions in China may offer some reasons for the 
somewhat bearish expectations. Empirical results show obvious inefficiency in China’s 
regional energy saving and emission reduction (Guo et al., 2017), China’s carbon 
emissions are still driven by significant longstanding inefficiencies in key industrial 
sectors (Zhang et al., 2016), and the impact of recent low-carbon policies suffers from 
a lag effect (Zhang et al., 2017). Nonetheless, Yi et al. (2016) indicate that the 40-45% 
carbon intensity target is very likely to be achieved by 2020 if Chinese government put 
more efforts in adjusting the industrial structure and primary energy mix, as well as 
promoting energy efficiency during the 13th FYP. Green and Stern (2017) describe 
important structural changes in the economy that are underway, which will enable 
Chinese emissions to peak well before 2030.  
Through a univariate regression using least squares method, where Gov stands for 
dummy variables that take the value of 1, if the respondent is from government sector 
and 0 otherwise. Expect are ordinal variables defining respondents’ expectation levels 
from 1 to 5, while Expect =1 means one consider it is very unlikely to achieve deep cuts 
in GHG intensity in the next 10 years and Expect =5 implies very likely. To regress 
Expect  against Gov , we find significant results that government stakeholders generally 
believed that deep cuts in GHG intensity will likely be achieved (Table 2). It implies 
that rather than stakeholders from other sectors, government stakeholders tend to be 
more hopeful of success in slashing GHG emissions in China in the future.  
Table 2 Output of univariate regression model Expect - Gov  
VARIABLE Model Expect - Gov 
  
Gov 1.593** 
 [2.428] 
Constant 2.407*** 
 [11.608] 
  
Observations 30 
R-squared 0.174 
Adj. R-squared 0.144 
t-statistics significance 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
To achieve deep emissions reductions, fully 60% of respondents preferred a market-
based instrument – an emission trading scheme was viewed as the most cost-effective 
policy instrument to slash GHG emissions in China (33.3%), followed by carbon 
taxation (26.7%), even though historically the Chinese government has used non-
market-based forms of regulation to achieve its environmental goals (Lo, 2014). 16.7% 
of the respondents preferred renewable energy subsidies/binding obligations or 
industrial emission performance standards. Feed-in tariffs (FITs) and preferential 
policies favoring natural gas and nuclear power were considered to be the least cost-
effective measures as only a single stakeholder (3.3%) voted for each (Figure 5).  
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Energy and low-carbon policies in China have gradually been switching from 
command-and-control policy to market-based approaches (Wang and Chen, 2015). 
There is no single policy, whether command-and-control or market-based, which has 
all the characteristics needed to mitigate emissions and address the full range of energy 
policy priorities including efficiency, effectiveness, promoting innovation, and security 
of supply. However, empirical studies have shown that market-based instruments will 
have significant impacts on efficiency improvement and emission reductions (Zhao et 
al., 2015), although there may be regional differences in the effectiveness of different 
instruments (Ren et al., 2016). Despite operating for only a short time and the immature 
market environment, the pilot ETS in China appear relatively promising with regard to 
carbon emissions reduction. (Zhang et al., 2017).  
 
Figure 5 Belief in most cost-effective policy instrument to cut GHG emissions  
3.1.2 Assessment on progress of Chinese pilot ETS 
Media coverage and many international observers have described Chinese carbon 
markets as moving quickly since the pilot ETS policy was launched by the NDRC in 
2010 (Zhang et al., 2014). By contrast, the bell shape of the solid line in Figure 6 
demonstrates that there are approximately equal shares of respondents who consider the 
development speed of ETS in China to be fast or slow: 36.7% of respondents agree the 
progress has been fast (26.7%) or even too fast (10%); another 40% have the opposite 
view and take progress to be slow (26.7%) or too slow (13.3%).  
After further investigation of respondents’ sectoral affiliations, a trend can be found as 
academic stakeholders tend to consider the development progress of ETS in China to 
be slow (dashed line in Figure 6). A univariate regression of Assess on Acad confirms 
the tendency (Table 3), where ACA are dummy variables that take the value of 1 if the 
respondent is from academia sector and 0 otherwise and Assess are ordinal variables 
defining respondents’ assessment levels from 1 to 5. Assess=1 means the respondent 
considers progress to be too slow and 5 implies too fast.  
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
33.33% 26.67% 3.33% 16.67% 16.67% 3.33%
emission trading scheme
carbon taxation
feed-in tariffs
renewable energy subsidies/binding obligations
industrial emission performance standards
preferential policy favoring natural gas and nuclear power
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Figure 6 Stakeholders’ assessment of progress of Chinese pilot ETS  
Table 3 Output of univariate regression model Assess-Acad 
VARIABLE Model Assess-Acad 
  
Acad -1.040* 
 [-1.791] 
Constant 3.240*** 
 [13.664] 
  
Observations 30 
R-squared 0.103 
Adj. R-squared 0.0707 
t-statistics significance 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Accordingly, there are approximately equal shares of respondents that are pessimistic 
(30%) or optimistic (33.3%) about the future of Chinese pilot ETS with another 23% 
describing progress as ‘average’. The fact that the largest single response was ‘not sure’ 
(36.7%) reveals the large uncertainties over the future of ETS in China. Using different 
shades to present assessment of progress, where lighter blue denotes slower and darker 
blue denotes faster, correlation between stakeholder assessment and perspectives can 
be visually observed from Figure 7:  respondents who believed the progress was too 
slow felt pessimistic or even very pessimistic while respondent assessments of too fast 
lead to relatively optimistic perspectives. In a univariate regression of Prospect on 
Assess, where Prospect and Assess are both ordinal variables that 1 means very 
pessimistic and too slow respectively while 5 means very optimistic and too fast 
respectively, the output confirms our observations by indicating a significant positive 
correlation between these two variables (Table 4).  
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Figure 7 Cross tabulation of stakeholder perspectives and assessment on Chinese 
carbon market  
Table 4 output of univariate regression model Prospect-Assess 
VARIABLE Model Prospect-Assess 
  
Assess 0.298** 
 [2.274] 
Constant 2.053*** 
 [4.755] 
  
Observations 30 
R-squared 0.156 
Adj. R-squared 0.126 
t-statistics in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
As a matter of fact, the preparatory stage for the Chinese pilot carbon markets was 
relatively short compared with other ETS developed around the world. Seven pilot ETS 
were launched in China within two years, whereas it took almost five years for the EU 
ETS (European Commission, 2015). The rapid development of ETS in China is largely 
the result of the strong political will of the government. Although all pilots have been 
launched, some of their design details have yet to be finalized, for instance, the 
monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) guidelines and regulations (ICAP, 2016). 
Nonetheless, Chinese stakeholders tend to equate “speed of development” with the 
rapid economic transition over the last few decades, which is overwhelmingly seen as 
beneficial (Lo, 2014).  
 
3.1.3 Expectation on Guangdong pilot ETS market price  
A quarter of the stakeholders were uncertain about the expected range of the average 
carbon price in Guangdong market. Nearly half (45.8%) expected the carbon price to 
be between 51-100 CNY/t CO2 (7-14 EUR/t CO2), which is higher than the 32 CNY/t 
CO2 (4 EUR/t CO2) found in the October, 2013 China Carbon Price Survey. Moreover, 
one-sixth (16.7%) of respondents proposed an even higher range of 101-200 CNY/t 
0.00%
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10.00%
15.00%
20.00%
Very pessimistic Pessimistic Not sure Optimistic Very optimistic
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CO2 (14-27 EUR/t CO2), while another third (33.3%) expected it to be lower, at 26-50 
CNY/t CO2 (3.5-7 EUR/t CO2). Only 4.2% believe the price range would be as low as 
0-25 CNY/tCO2 (3.5 EUR/t CO2) (Figure 8).  
 
Figure 8 Perceived expectation on average carbon price in Guangdong pilot ETS 
At the time of the survey, in mid-2014, the Guangdong market price was around 60 
CNY/tCO2 (8 EUR/t CO2) with very low turnover (Figure 9). After decreasing over the 
latter half of 2014, the price in the Guangdong ETS dropped to around 15 CNY/t CO2 
(2 EUR/t CO2), which is consistent with the expectation of only a small fraction (4.2%) 
of respondents.  
 
Figure 9 Price and volume in Guangdong pilot ETS (1 Jan, 2016- 1 Sept, 2017)  
Source: ChinaCarbon.net.cn 
During follow-up interviews, stakeholders expressed mixed views on the impact of 
carbon pricing through ETS in China. Government officials were far more confident 
than industrial and academic stakeholders. One government official considered the 
carbon market pilot in the province would be robust in response to the economic cycle, 
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and he believed the intensity allowance cap scheme would adjust automatically. An 
official from Guangdong (the largest pilot scheme with an absolute cap) suggested the 
carbon price in Guangdong could be supported through a floor price in the auctioning 
scheme, as a carbon floor price would create more certainty about the minimum price, 
providing a clearer signal for investors. 
Three stakeholders from carbon-intensive industries expressed some concern during 
follow-up interviews about the impact of the economic cycle on carbon allowance 
prices, but in general, they preferred retaining allowances for future compliance periods. 
Through cross tabulation of stakeholder expectations on carbon price in Guangdong 
ETS with respondents’ sectors, we see that industrial stakeholders are more likely to 
expect the price to stay the same or fall.   
 
Figure 10 Cross tabulation of stakeholders’ sectors and expectation on average carbon 
price in Guangdong pilot ETS  
Conversely, through a univariate regression of Price, ordinal variables representing 
respondents’ price expectations (1 = 0-25 CNY/t CO2 while 5 = above 200 CNY/t CO2), 
on Acad, whether the respondent is from academia (Acad=1 means respondents are 
from academia while Acad=0 reflects non-academic respondents), we find that 
academic stakeholders significantly expected (at 90% confidence level) the price to be 
relatively high compared with other stakeholders (Table 5).  
Table 5 Output of univariate regression model Price-Acad 
VARIABLE model Price-Acad 
  
Acad 1.200* 
 [1.936] 
Constant 2.000*** 
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 [7.906] 
  
Observations 30 
R-squared 0.118 
Adj. R-squared 0.0866 
t-statistics in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Still, one academic stakeholder involved in setting up the rules for one of the pilot 
carbon markets believed there was significant over-allocation of allowances in most 
pilot markets in China, and negative impacts would result during the compliance stage. 
Another academic was concerned that the quality of the initial reporting of emissions 
could damage the reputation of emissions trading more generally in China, and that this 
effect was not been widely appreciated (i.e., there was significant over-reporting of 
emissions at the initial stages). 
3.2. Perceptions of interactions between incentives 
In spite of the high political priority given to ETS as a policy instrument, the Chinese 
energy system is primarily regulated by administrative measures rather than market-
based instruments (Lo, 2014). For example, China’s electricity market is not fully 
liberalised and the electricity tariff is set by government, and industries suffering higher 
cost in paying for carbon allowance or emission reductions cannot directly pass the cost 
through to consumers. Meanwhile, in recent years, a range of policies including carbon 
taxation, renewable obligations and energy efficiency quota trading mechanisms have 
been mentioned by both government officials and leading academics in China. All such 
parallel mechanisms could reduce the implied allowance price in the ETS and give 
investors a misleading signal over the value of carbon in longer-term investments. 
Figure 11 summarizes the existing low-carbon policies developed by central 
government and the specific implementation plans in Guangdong Province.  
Even though earlier literature indicates Chinese stakeholders preferred market-based 
instruments such as emissions trading over regulation (Lo, 2014; Liang and Reiner, 
2011) and in spite of the current moves towards a national emissions trading scheme 
building on the seven pilots, a carbon tax is still being actively considered as a major 
policy option by the Ministry of Finance in China. There have also been longstanding 
discussions on how best to encourage renewable energy in China and having a binding 
national renewable target is one of the options that has been discussed. Consequently, 
for the case of Guangdong ETS Pilot, we have sought to explore opinions regarding the 
interactions between the ETS and parallel carbon and energy policies. 
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15 May 
2014
01 Apr. 
2010
01 Jan. 
2006
Central Government of China Specific Policies in Guangdong Province
Main existing low carbon and energy policies in China since 2006
Renewable Energy Law
 Amendments to the PRC Renewable Energy Law 
31 Aug. 
2007
The Mid-and-long Term Development Plan for 
Renewable Energy (NDRC)
In 2020, consumption of renewable energy contribute to 
15% of total energy consumption
29 Oct. 
2011
Notice of Implementing Pilot Carbon Emissions 
Trading (NDRC)
Pilot ETS in Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Chongqing, 
Guangdong, Hubei, Shenzhen
2014-2015 Energy Saving and Emission Reduction 
Development Action Plan (State Council)
Reduce carbon intensity by 4% and 3.5% in 2014 and 
2015.
6 Aug. 
2012
Energy Saving and Emission Reduction in the 12th 
Five-Year Plan (State Council)
1 Jan. 
2013
Energy Development in the 12th Five-Year Plan (State 
Council)
7 Jun. 
2014
2014-2015 Eenergy Development Action Plan (State 
Council)
22 Feb. 
2012
Guangdong Province Comprehensive Work 
Plan of Energy Saving and Emission 
Reduction in the 12th FYP 
In 2015, reduce energy consumption intensity 
by 18% and 31.46% compared to 2010, and 
2005; reduce total CO2 emission by 14.8% 
based on 2010. 
11 Oct. 
2014
Guangdong Province Energy Saving and 
Emission Reduction Development Action 
Plan in 2014-2015 
2014-2015, reduce energy consumption 
intensity by 3.4% and 2.32% during the two 
years; reduce CO2 intensity 3.5% annually.
1 Dec. 
2011
Notice of Control GHGs Emission Work Plan 
in the 12th FYP 
During the12th FYP, reduce CO2 intensity and 
energy consumption by 19.5% and 18% based 
on 2010.
18 Dec. 
2013
Guangdong Pilot ETS began operations
Forthcoming energy and low carbon policies, such as Renewable Energy Obligation, Carbon Taxation, etc. 
Figure 11 existing main national and Guangdong province climate change policies 
(Sources: www.ndrc.gov.cn; www.gov.cn) 
3.2.1 Perceptions of the permit price collapse in the EU ETS 
Before moving to the Chinese situation in detail, we asked how stakeholders viewed 
the price collapse in the EU ETS. The EU allowance price experienced high volatility 
(both in phase I before crashing in 2006 and in phase II the price again started relatively 
high but then crashed by 2009,) the widely-held view for the causes are over-allocation 
of permits to legacy emitters (Hintermann, 2010), the effects of the Global Financial 
Crisis on economic growth and the weakness of its regulation, etc. (Perthuis and 
20 
 
Trotignon, 2014). Recent studies have found the overlapped public policies such as 
renewable policies and use of international credits also helped to explain the price 
plunge (Koch et al., 2014).  
No surprise that litter awareness of overlapped low-carbon policies would impact the 
price is also reflected in our survey. Global economic downturn was blamed by the 
majority (18 out of 30 respondents), followed by excess emission allowance 
allocations (12/30) and failure to reach binding international targets in the 
international negotiations (9/30). Only a relatively small number blamed alternative 
emission reduction mechanisms or increased volumes of Certified Emission 
Reductions (CERs) from the Clean Development Mechanism.  
 
Figure 12 Main reasons for collapse of carbon price in EU ETS 
3.2.2 Attitudes onwards possible conflicts between multiple incentives 
Accordingly, we designed two what-if scenario questions and two statement acceptance 
questions to explore reactions to hypothetical major policy announcements that we 
would expect to adversely affect the carbon price by reducing demand for allowances. 
Firstly, stakeholders were asked to consider, if a higher than expected short-term 
renewable energy target were enacted in the pilot cities (e.g. renewable energy target 
increases from 10% to 15%), what would be the most likely impact on carbon price in 
the pilot carbon market?  Nearly half (48.3%) of respondents expected the carbon price 
in these pilot carbon markets to decrease by a small amount, and a further 3.5% 
expected a large decrease in the carbon price. However, almost a quarter (24.1%) of 
respondents believed there would be a small increase in carbon price, and 3.5% thought 
it would be a large increase. Over one fifth (20.7%) anticipated that the price would 
remain the same and a renewable energy target would not impact on the carbon price 
in the pilot carbon market (blue bar in Figure 13).  
By contrast, when stakeholders were asked if an unexpected national carbon tax were 
suddenly announced for immediate implementation across all major industry sectors, 
surprisingly, a large majority (59.3%) of respondents believed the carbon price in the 
ETS would increase and almost one fifth of the total sample (18.5%) thought it would 
be a large increase. Only 25.9% of stakeholders believed that the carbon price would 
18 12 9 5 5
Global economic downturn
Excess allocation of carbon emission permits by individual countries
Failure of United Nations negotiations to set binding international targets
Large volume of Certification Emission Reduction (CER) due to the increase in CDM projects
Alternative emission reduction mechanism such as carbon tax, renewable target or FITs
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decrease if a carbon tax were to be introduced (orange bar in Figure 13). Three 
respondents skipped the question.  
 
Figure 13 Stakeholder expectations of carbon market response to imposing new 
ambitious energy and climate policies  
It is striking that the majority of stakeholders believed that the impact of introducing a 
renewable target would be to depress carbon prices, while a new carbon tax was seen 
as lifting the carbon allowance price. The reactions to introducing a tougher renewable 
energy target and an unexpected national carbon tax provide contrasting results. In 
theory at least, all else being equal, introducing either measure in addition to the carbon 
market would reduce the allowance price in the ETS scheme. 
The majority of stakeholders in follow-up interviews, appreciated that introducing low-
carbon policies in parallel (such as a carbon tax or renewable obligations) would affect 
the carbon allowance price in the ETS but differed on both the likely magnitude and 
direction. Two industry and two academic stakeholders during follow-up questioning 
suggested that renewable energy targets might increase carbon reductions and in turn 
increase the carbon allowance price, but that carbon taxation policies could provide a 
‘carbon price floor’ to support the allowance prices. Another academic stakeholder 
believed raising the renewable energy target by 5% could reduce total carbon emissions, 
while a carbon tax could shift the ETS abatement cost curve to the right, and both 
measures could significantly reduce the demand and price of carbon allowances in the 
Chinese ETS.  
In the follow-up interviews, two government stakeholders and one stakeholder from the 
financial sector still did not believe the impact of other mechanisms on carbon pricing 
mechanisms would be substantial. The two government officials, though recognizing 
the potential impact of parallel low-carbon incentives on carbon allowance pricing, 
believed that it was important to introduce more market-based instruments for emission 
reductions and environmental protection in China, such as trading in energy efficiency 
quota and water rights trading.  
To further testify whether stakeholders would recognize possible conflicts that might 
emerge when there are multiple incentives. Specifically, we asked about the extent to 
3.5%
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20.7% 24.1%
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which they agreed that “incentives, such as ‘cap and trade’ systems, carbon taxation, 
renewable energy obligations, and emission performance standard etc., may conflict, 
and generate different costs and benefits in different situations”. A significant fraction 
(43.3%) of respondents agreed with the statement, while 23.3% disagreed (Figure 14). 
 
Figure 14 Respondent attitudes on statement of policy interactions 
As Figure 14 reveals, there is a slight tendency for stakeholders to recognize the 
possible conflicts between carbon markets and overlapped climate change policies and 
that academic stakeholders are slig. Take Attit as ordinal variables representing the 
extent of agreement or disagreement with the statement, where 1 = strongly disagree 
and 5 = strongly agree, significant result can be discovered from a univariate regression 
of Attit on Acad (Table 6).  The idea is generally more widely accepted among 
academics than by stakeholders in other sectors.  
Table 6 output of univariate regression model Attit-Acad 
VARIABLE model Attit-Acad 
  
Acad 0.720* 
 [1.906] 
Constant 3.080*** 
 [19.977] 
  
Observations 30 
R-squared 0.115 
Adj. R-squared 0.0833 
t-statistics in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Furthermore, it is interesting to find out that there is relationship between their attitudes 
on the statement and how much time they claimed have been spent on energy saving 
and emission reduction policies in the past year. Taking different shades to present the 
time spent on climate change-related policies, the positive correlation between time 
spent and respondents’ attitudes on the statement is apparent in Figure 11.  Again, 
according to the regression of Attit on Time, which is a set of ordinal variables 
representing time spent working on climate change-related policies, the result further 
supported our finding.  
 
Figure 11 Comparison of stakeholder views of possible conflicts between multiple 
incentives and time spent working on energy saving and emission reduction policies.    
Table 7 Output of univariate regression model Attit-Time 
VARIABLE model Attit-Time 
  
Time 0.288** 
 [2.061] 
Constant 2.605*** 
 [8.124] 
  
Observations 30 
R-squared 0.132 
Adj. R-squared 0.101 
t-statistics in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The follow-up interviews also demonstrated divergent views on the compatibility of 
multiple low-carbon incentive policies. Two government stakeholders considered 
multiple policy instruments to be better than a single mechanism. However, all 
academics surveyed were concerned that multiple mechanisms could distort the price 
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signal for environmental goods, and provide incorrect signals. Although quite a few 
respondents (33.3%) selected the carbon market as their preferred mechanism in an 
earlier question, no stakeholder in the follow-up interviews believed that the ETS by 
itself could completely replace other parallel low-carbon incentives in China.  
The situation in Europe is very similar. Most stakeholders perceive the trading scheme 
as the main instrument to cut down GHGs, but there is a growing view that the ETS is 
not the only instrument required and will need to be combined with other instruments 
(Fujiwara, 2016). Many stakeholders expressed concern at the negative impact that 
policies had on carbon prices, especially stakeholders from the power and energy 
trading sectors (Gaast et al., 2016), and most welcomed the Market Stability Reserve 
(MSR) as a means of addressing the surplus of allowances. Others still believe though 
that policies supporting renewables have only limited negative impacts on the EU ETS 
(Marcantonini et al., 2017).  
3.2.3 Attitudes on linkages to international carbon markets 
There have been many studies on the potential to link national and subnational emission 
trading schemes, as in the case o Quebec and California, and as was explored for 
Australia and the European Union (Ranson and Stavins, 2016; Mehling and Haites, 
2009). With regard to the statement that ‘integrating the Chinese carbon trading market 
into the international trading system could help reduce the adverse impact on carbon 
price from the interactions of other national carbon reduction incentive mechanisms’, a 
large number (36.7%) of stakeholders supported it, whereas only 13.3% did not. 
Nevertheless, for both statements, a relatively large proportion (33.3% and 50% 
respectively) could not decide and no stakeholder expressed a strongly-held attitude (i.e. 
strongly agreed or strongly disagreed). 
In follow-up interviews, one government official and two academic stakeholders 
emphasized the importance of linking the Chinese carbon market with international 
carbon markets, arguing that such links could help improve the design and operation of 
the domestic carbon market in the long-term. Another government official was unsure 
about the need for international linkages but believed that such linkage could boost the 
liquidity of the pilot schemes. Industry stakeholders were also unsure about linkage but 
two were very interested in the impact linkage would have on allowance prices in the 
long-term. One academic strongly opposed linkage on the grounds that international 
linkages might reduce the freedom of Chinese climate policy and constrain the Chinese 
position in future international climate policy negotiations.  
3.3. Challenges for Chinese carbon markets 
3.3.1 MRV system in Chinese carbon markets 
We asked stakeholders to rank potential problems with the monitoring, reporting and 
verification (MRV) system that they believed could negatively affect the carbon market. 
Technical issues aroused the greatest concern. The top challenge was viewed as 
incorrect and incomplete historical databases, followed by incorrect carbon auditing 
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methodologies. The lack of third party verification and auditing organizations ranked 
the third. A lack of skilled workers for carbon auditing and corruption during the 
auditing process were at the bottom of the list (Table 8).  
Table 8 Ranking of potential challenges with regards to MRV system 
 1 2 3 4 5 Average 
ranking 
Incorrect and incomplete historical database 62% 15% 12% 4% 8% 1.81 
Incorrect carbon auditing methodology 19% 38% 19% 12% 12% 2.58 
Lack of third party verification and auditing 
organizations 
19% 22% 22% 30% 7% 2.85 
Lack of skilled workers in carbon auditing 4% 15% 23% 19% 38% 3.73 
Corruption during auditing process 0% 8% 23% 35% 35% 3.96 
 
3.3.2 Implementation of Chinese carbon trading market 
In terms of potential implementation challenges, the pervasive lack of accurate and 
relevant information and knowledge on the subject ranked first, as most respondents 
agreed that ‘enterprises were still confused about carbon emission trading and worried 
it might increase costs’. Concerns about potential negative impacts on GDP growth (i.e., 
that the ‘cap’ implied reduced energy consumption) came second. Stakeholders ranked 
the challenge of limited financial instruments and the absence of derivatives in carbon 
credit third, followed by impacts of other energy and low-carbon policies (e.g., 
emission performance standards and renewable energy obligations may reduce demand 
for emissions reductions in carbon markets). Finally, limited financial instruments and 
institutions were viewed as the least significant challenge of the five listed. 
Table 9 Ranking potential challenges with regards to implementation 
 1 2 3 4 5 Average 
ranking 
Enterprises still confused about carbon 
emission trading, and worried it may 
increase costs 
44% 44% 7% 4% 0% 1.7 
The ‘Cap’ implies decreased energy 
consumption, which may negatively 
influence GDP growth 
42% 19% 23% 0% 15% 2.27 
Limited financial instruments; Lack of 
carbon credit derivatives 
8% 15% 31% 23% 23% 3.38 
Limited relevant financial institutions 0% 12% 35% 27% 27% 3.69 
Other energy and low-carbon policies 
such as Emission Performance Standards 
and Renewable Energy obligation may 
decrease demand for emission reduction 
in carbon trading markets 
8% 8% 4% 46% 35% 3.92 
 
Stakeholders also suggested other challenges for the Chinese carbon market including: 
(a) absence of strong regulatory support from the central government; (b) the need to 
develop novel carbon emission reduction technologies; (c) increased production costs 
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for business; (d) the difficulty of setting a ‘cap’ in any emission trading system; and (e) 
the need for a comprehensive Chinese carbon market, which they felt would inevitably 
prove costly. 
During follow-up interviews, both government and industry stakeholders considered 
the major challenge for the Chinese ETS to be how it might evolve towards a 
comprehensive national scheme. Government officials considered the lack of trading 
activities to be a short-term constraint on the carbon market. Two academic 
stakeholders were concerned about the quality of data based on initial auditing, and 
cited the limitations of budget, time and capacity to address these problems, noting 
there was sometimes less than CNY 100,000 (approximately EUR 13,500) available 
for an initial survey and audit at a large conglomerate or energy company. One 
academic claimed the poor quality of initial data could pose serious challenges and lead 
to a crisis of confidence affecting future development. An industry stakeholder 
suggested that a professional standards institute should be established to better regulate 
the quality of MRV.  
4. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
Given expectations of continued high levels of economic and energy demand growth 
in China, half of the stakeholders surveyed considered a deep cut in emissions in the 
next decade to be unlikely. Government stakeholders generally were more hopeful of 
success in slashing GHG emissions in China and were far more confident than industrial 
and academic stakeholders in the potential benefits from carbon pricing in China.  
Academic stakeholders tended to consider the progress of ETS development in China 
to be slow, and generally felt pessimistic about the potential of Chinese carbon markets 
to reduce emissions due to over-allocation of permits and imperfect auditing regulations, 
even though their expectations on the future market price in the Guangdong pilot were 
relatively high compared with other stakeholders.  
Analogously, industrial stakeholders also expressed concern over the impact of the 
economic cycle on carbon allowance prices. Although there was a wide range of views 
future carbon price, overall more expected the price to drop, led by industrial sector 
stakeholders. Possible reasons for the bearish attitudes include concerns over an 
incomplete MRV system, lack of awareness among many enterprises of the benefits of 
carbon markets, they consider participation in the market as merely fulfilling the need 
for governments’ encouragement, social responsibility or corporate strategy (Yang, et 
al., 2016).  By contrast, academic stakeholders were more bullish in their expectations. 
There is relatively limited understanding of how other mechanisms might affect the 
price of carbon allowances, even though more than one-third of respondents considered 
the interaction to be a significant challenge. In theory, both a new additional carbon tax 
and a more stringent renewable target would shift the abatement curve to the right 
thereby reducing the allowance price. In our survey however, many stakeholders 
27 
 
believed that renewable targets would dampen the carbon price, but a majority expected 
a carbon tax to actually boost the carbon price seen in the market. Most academic 
respondents recognized that interactions between the carbon market and other energy 
and low-carbon policies may decrease “demand” in emission trading markets. It is 
noteworthy that the degree of understanding of interactions between instruments was 
positively associated with claimed time spent working on energy saving and emission 
reduction policies.  
Energy and low-carbon policies in China has been shifting from command-and-control 
policies to more market-based approaches. Past studies have indicated that a large 
majority of Chinese stakeholders would prefer market-based instruments to control 
GHGs (Liu et al., 2013; Lo, 2014). This enthusiasm for markets is consistent with our 
results, as an emission trading mechanism was deemed the most cost-effective 
instrument to achieve deep cuts in emissions in China. Therefore, disagreements over 
the perceived interaction between overlapping energy and low-carbon policies may 
undermine the ETS carbon price, even though in committing to launch a unified 
national carbon market by 2017, support for an ETS was unequivocally and repeatedly 
confirmed at the highest political level.  
Objectively, the preparatory stage for the Chinese pilot carbon markets has been 
relatively short compared with the systems in Korea, Quebec, and California (World 
Bank, 2014), but very few stakeholders considered the pace to be “too fast”. The 
development of a national ETS has taken place in parallel with the pilot schemes and 
momentum has been growing in China toward a national ETS with the government 
originally committing to a multi-sector ETS being up and running in 2017. While 
discussion of whether Chinese national ETS should ultimately employ a top-down or 
bottom-up approach is still ongoing, and the road map has not yet formally announced 
beyond the initial announcement in December 2017, the NDRC has at least initially 
adopted a top-down approach towards developing a national system.  Moreover, the 
effort to get a national system up and running so quickly may explain some of the 
problems and delays encountered by the national ETS driven primarily by the lack of 
baseline data and the need for an operational data collection system (Feng, 2017).   
Our findings suggest there are still some important unresolved issues confronting the 
new national system. It would have been more desirable if in the process of 
implementing the national ETS, the Chinese authorities were able to learn lessons from 
the pilot systems. The lack of transparency in disclosing market information, a lack of 
knowledge among market participants, and an immature MRV system poses 
uncertainties for carbon price setting. Fuss et al. (2008) claimed that climate change 
policy uncertainties would induce industries to wait and see whether strong interests in 
effective and efficient investment response to its policy signals will be brought out by 
the government, which implies the degree of market information obtained would 
influence industries’ investment decisions on carbon-saving technologies. In addition, 
the diversity of stakeholders’ predictions of the carbon price reflect a lack of consensus.  
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Drawing on the findings of our study, we offer the following policy recommendations: 
• Government and other key stakeholders have placed too much focus on the price 
and volume of carbon allowances in the China’s pilot ETS schemes; 
stakeholders and policymakers should seek to continuously assess and improve 
the quality of regulation, market integrity and information disclosure.  
• The inability of many stakeholders to understand that other low-carbon and 
renewable policies would reduce the price in the carbon market, reflects the 
need for capacity building among current and future market participants. 
• As the carbon market is not likely to be the only major low-carbon policy 
instrument in China, the ETS carbon price needs to be interpreted cautiously.  
• Alternative carbon pricing signals, such as a government shadow carbon price 
should be proposed alongside a carbon market allowance price to signal to 
industry the short-term and long-term costs of CO2 emissions.  
• Regulators and carbon exchanges should provide more transparent, real-time 
information for market participants to facilitate price setting.  
• The Chinese government should invest heavily in MRV systems, and establish 
a set of best practices, to provide greater confidence for market participants.  
• In the process of moving to a national carbon market, more effort should be 
placed on improving the compatibility of carbon market pilots. China has the 
relatively rare benefit of having conducted seven pilots with varying 
specifications, so it is important that time is taken to learn from the different 
pilots. We have conducted an in-depth assessment of only one of the seven 
pilots from the perspective of different key stakeholders and before fully 
launching a national system, a comprehensive review across all seven pilots 
would be very beneficial. 
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